Arbitration Revisited: Preemption of California’s Unconscionability Doctrine after Concepcion by Friedman, David
FRIEDMAN FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)  1/26/2016 12:46 PM 
 
 
ARBITRATION REVISITED: 
PREEMPTION OF CALIFORNIA’S 
UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE 
AFTER CONCEPCION 
DAVID FRIEDMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Courts have often been called upon to resolve conflicts between 
state law and federal arbitration. In 1925, Congress enacted the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), a legislative framework for 
enforcing arbitration agreements throughout the United States.1  The 
rationale was twofold.2 First, Congress wanted to abolish the deep-
seated “common law hostility” toward arbitration.3 Second, it sought 
to mandate enforcement of arbitration by the states.4 Toward these 
ends, Section 2 of the FAA made arbitration agreements generally 
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” unless a court found contractual 
grounds for revocation.5 These “grounds” came to be understood as 
generally applicable contract defenses, typically the province of state 
law, but applying the law proved difficult.6 
Under the Supremacy Clause, federal regulation preempts 
conflicting state law.7 This means that state laws which frustrate the 
purposes of Congress must yield.8 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, the Court held that the FAA preempted California’s 
unconscionability doctrine because it was an obstacle to federal 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2017, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended 
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2015)). 
 2.  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 6.  See, e.g., Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (describing a 
number of challenges to arbitration generally). 
 7.  See infra Part II.A. 
 8.  Southland, 465 U.S. at 16. 
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regulation.9  After Concepcion, however, federal and state courts were 
still sharply divided on the interpretation of arbitration agreements 
that specifically invoked state law.10 
This Commentary discusses the consequences of Concepcion and 
its implications in Imburgia v. DIRECTV, a similar case where the 
California Court of Appeal refused to enforce an arbitration 
agreement under the doctrine of unconscionability. Part I summarizes 
the factual background in Imburgia. Part II explores the legislative 
and statutory bases for the Supreme Court’s ruling. Part III explains 
the California Court of Appeal’s rationale and holding. Part IV 
presents the specific arguments put forth by the Petitioner and 
Respondent. Part V analyzes the facts in light of the arbitration 
agreement’s plain meaning, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Concepcion, and public policy and concludes the Court should reverse 
the lower court and hold that federal preemption applies. 
I.  FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondents Amy Imburgia and Kathy Greiner 
(“Imburgia”) were customers of Defendant-Petitioner, DIRECTV, a 
satellite television provider.11 Respondents signed DIRECTV’s 
Customer Agreement (“Agreement”).12 DIRECTV assessed early 
termination fees after Imburgia canceled her service contract.13 On 
September 17, 2008, Imburgia filed a class action complaint in 
California against DIRECTV, claiming the company charged 
improper early termination fees.14 Imburgia sought declaratory relief 
and damages for unjust enrichment, false advertising, and violations 
of three California statutes, including the Consumer Legal Remedies 
Act (“CLRA”).15 
Two provisions within DIRECTV’s Agreement governed the 
terms of service and the resolution of disputes.16 Section 10 contained 
 
 9.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 10.  See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 11.  Joint Appendix at 59–60, Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2014) (No. B239361). 
 12.  Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 192. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. Imburgia alleged DIRECTV violated the Consumers Legal Remedies Act 
(“CLRA”) CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1756 (West 2015), the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE  §§ 17200–17210 (West 2015), and the California Civil Code, CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1671(d) (West 2015).   
 16.  Id. 
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a choice of law provision specifying that the contract would be 
“governed by the rules and regulations of the Federal 
Communications Commission, other applicable federal laws, and the 
laws of the state and local area where Service is provided to [the 
customer].”17 Imburgia’s service was supplied in California,18 making 
California law applicable.19 Section 9 provided that parties would 
resolve disputes solely by arbitration.20 Arbitration would be 
“governed by the Federal Arbitration Act” and parties waived rights 
to “arbitrate any claim as a representative member of a class or in a 
private attorney general capacity.”21 Section 9(c)(ii) (hereinafter “the 
poison pill clause”) stated that if “the law of your state would find this 
agreement to dispense with class arbitration procedures 
unenforceable, then this entire Section 9 is unenforceable.”22 
When Imburgia signed the Agreement, certain class action 
waivers were “unconscionable . . . and should not be enforced” under 
California common law.23 Thus, DIRECTV did not raise arbitration as 
one of its seventeen affirmative defenses.24 In 2010, the Supreme 
Court ruled in AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion that the FAA 
preempted California’s law against class arbitration waivers in 
adhesion contracts.25 DIRECTV thereby moved in superior court to 
compel arbitration.26 The court, however, denied the motion, citing the 
specific invocation of state law in § 10.27 The California Court of 
Appeal affirmed DIRECTV’s interlocutory appeal28 and the 
California Supreme Court denied review.29 DIRECTV appealed and 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari30 on the question of whether “a 
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 341. 
 19.  Brief for the Respondents at 2, DIRECTV, Inc. v Imburgia, No. 14-462 (U.S. Mar. 23, 
2015) [hereinafer “Brief for the Respondents”]. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 2–3. 
 23.  Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 24.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 19, at 6. 
 25.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. An adhesion contract is a “standard-form contract 
prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position . . . with little choice 
about the terms.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (10th ed. 2014). 
 26.  Imburgia v. DirecTV Inc., NO. BC398295, 2012 WL 7657788, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 12, 2012). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
 29.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 19, at 5. 
 30.  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 135 S. Ct. 1547 (2015). 
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reference to state law in an arbitration agreement governed by the 
[FAA] requires that the application of state law be preempted by the 
[FAA].”31 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Supremacy Clause and Federal Preemption 
The doctrine of federal preemption is rooted in the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution, which provides for the supremacy of 
federal law over state law.32 Congress may therefore 
“preempt, i.e., invalidate, a state law through federal legislation.”33 
Preemption may be express or implicit.34 Implicit preemption includes 
field preemption, when Congress “foreclose[s] any state regulation in 
the area,”35 and conflict preemption, when “compliance with both 
state and federal law is impossible.”36 Conflict preemption occurs 
when a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”37 Any state 
laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law” are invalid.38 
B.  The Federal Arbitration Act in Context 
The Federal Arbitration Act is a “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration.”39 Recognizing the “costliness and delays of litigation,” the 
FAA was “motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to 
enforce agreements into which parties had entered.”40 Congress 
specifically intended for the FAA to prevent states from undermining 
arbitration agreements.41 It conferred a singular right to enforce 
arbitration agreements and nothing further.42 Congress stacked the 
deck so greatly in favor of arbitration that the Supreme Court wrote 
in unambiguous terms: 
 
 31.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, 135 S. Ct. 1547 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015) (No. 14-462). 
 32.  U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 33.  Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012). 
 36.  California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989). 
 37.  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 38.  Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985). 
 39.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 40.  H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1 (1924). 
 41.  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
 42.  See 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (“It creates no new legislation, grants no new rights, 
except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts.”). 
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The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in 
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of 
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.43 
Although arbitration proceedings have grown increasingly complex 
since Congress enacted the FAA in 1925,44 the Supreme Court has 
consistently interpreted the FAA as favoring the enforcement of 
arbitration.45 
Under the FAA, arbitration is a matter of contract.46 Like other 
contracts, privately negotiated arbitration agreements are enforced 
according to the terms of the instrument.47 Section 2 is the “primary 
substantive provision”48 and states that an arbitration agreement 
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”49 The 
final clause of this section, known as the “savings clause,” limits the 
type of defenses that may make arbitration agreements 
unenforceable.50 
The savings clause allows a party to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement based on grounds generally applicable to “any contract.”51 
The clause therefore solely provides for those defenses which apply 
generally under contract law, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability.52 Defenses that do not apply to “any contract” are 
barred.53 This includes “defenses that apply only to arbitration”54 
 
 43.  Moses, 460 U.S. at 24. 
 44.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (“[C]lass 
arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA in 1925.”). For a 
concise explanation of the evolution of federal arbitration since 1925, see JON O. 
SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30934, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: 
BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2003). 
 45.  See, e.g., Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 288 (2010) 
(stating that Congress’s “national policy favoring arbitration required ambiguity . . . to be 
resolved in favor of arbitrability”); see also Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008) (stating 
that the FAA’s preemption of conflicting state law was “well-established” and “repeatedly 
reaffirmed”). 
 46.  Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010). 
 47.  9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 48.  Moses, 460 U.S. at 24. 
 49.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See id. (emphasis added). 
 52.  Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
 53.  See id. at 686–87 (emphasizing that defenses must apply to any, or every, contract). 
 54.  Id. at 687. 
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because Congress intended to put arbitration “upon the same footing 
as other contracts.”55 Thus, federal law prohibited the courts from 
“singling out” arbitration provisions as suspect.56 Although generally 
applicable contract defenses may make an arbitration agreement 
unenforceable, they must not “interfere with . . . federal law.”57 
C.  The Modern Doctrine: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court considered 
whether the FAA prohibits states from conditioning the 
enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability of 
classwide arbitration procedures.58 Under a similar set of facts to 
those in Imburgia, Vincent Concepcion signed an arbitration 
agreement which contained a waiver requiring parties to dispute in 
their “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any 
purported class or representative proceeding.”59 Concepcion, however, 
opposed arbitration, arguing that the California Supreme Court’s 
decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court rendered class arbitration 
waivers in adhesion contracts unconscionable.60 In that case, 
California held that because class arbitration waivers are 
“indisputably” and “unfairly” one-sided, they are invalid.61 
The Supreme Court disagreed.62 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Scalia considered the analysis straightforward—conflicting state rules 
were displaced by the FAA.63 Scalia continued: 
Although § 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable 
contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-
law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
 
 55.  H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1 (1924). 
 56.  Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); see also Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (stating that Congress enacted the FAA to embody 
the national policy that arbitration agreements are on equal footing with other contracts). 
 57.  Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985). 
 58.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
 59.  Id. at 1744. 
 60.  Id. at 1745; see generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 
2005) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2015)) (“[W]hen the [class action] waiver is found 
in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties 
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the 
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of 
consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the 
exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or 
property of another.’”). 
 61.  Id. at 1108. 
 62.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 63.  Id. at 1787. 
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FAA’s objectives. As we have said, a federal statute’s saving clause 
‘‘‘cannot in reason be construed as [allowing] a common law right, 
the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent 
with the provisions of the act. In other words, the act cannot be 
held to destroy itself.’”64 
Therefore, otherwise permissible defenses may be preempted if they 
interfere with the FAA or its interests in promoting “streamlined 
proceedings and expeditious results.”65 Justice Scalia further wrote 
that “[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interfere[d] 
with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[d] a 
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”66 Hence, the Court held that the 
FAA preempted California’s Discover Bank rule and 
unconscionability doctrine.67 
D.  California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act and the New Limits on 
Unconscionability 
California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) prohibits 
“unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”68 As a consumer protection statute, the CLRA states that 
any individual entitled to bring any action under the CLRA may also 
bring their claims as a class action suit.69 To this effect, the CLRA 
creates a statutory right to class action litigation.70 Section 1751 of the 
CLRA is an “antiwaiver provision” that reads: “Any waiver by a 
consumer of the provisions of [the CLRA] is contrary to public policy 
and shall be unenforceable and void.”71 
 
 64.  Id. at 1748 (citations omitted). 
 65.  Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2008). 
 66.  Id. at 1748. The Court relied on predominantly practical concerns in discussing why 
class arbitration was “inconsistent” with the FAA. Justice Scalia wrote: 
“[T]he ‘changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action 
arbitration’ are ‘fundamental.’ This is obvious as a structural matter: Classwide 
arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different procedures 
and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes more difficult. And while it is 
theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the class-
certification question, arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often-
dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent parties. 
The conclusion follows that class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured 
by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.” 
Id. at 1750 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 
(2010)). 
 67.  Id. at 1744. 
 68.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2015). 
 69.  Id. § 1781. 
 70.  Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 831 (2015). 
 71.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1751 (West 2015). 
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Since Imburgia was initially decided, the doctrine of 
unconscionability under California law has changed.72 In Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, however, California’s high court 
continued to assert unconscionability as a valid defense to 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement.73 Under the FAA’s savings 
clause, California claimed an uninterrupted right to apply 
unconscionability to arbitration agreements that were “unreasonably 
harsh, oppressive, or one-sided.”74 The court therefore interpreted 
Concepcion as barring only “facial” and “as-applied” discrimination 
against arbitration.75 This included the CLRA’s antiwaiver provision.76 
Because the provision made class arbitration waivers unenforceable, 
the court in Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC subsequently 
reasoned it disfavored arbitration and was preempted.77 
III.  HOLDING 
In Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., the California Court of Appeal 
affirmed the judgment below and held that the Agreement did not 
require arbitration.78 The court reasoned the FAA merely compelled 
enforcement of contracts “in accordance with the terms thereof.”79 
Not enforcing arbitration was therefore “fully consistent” with the 
FAA because the parties had freely contracted to resolve disputes 
 
 72.  See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 269, 289 (2013) (“What is 
new is that Concepcion clarifies the limits the FAA places on state unconscionability rules as 
they pertain to arbitration agreements.”). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. The Concepcion court notably used broader terms than those articulated by the 
California high court. Nowhere in either the majority opinion nor Justice Breyer’s dissent do 
“facial” or “as-applied” discrimination appear. Rather, the Court’s holding speaks of 
“obstacle[s] to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Any instance of as-applied 
discrimination would likely constitute an obstacle, but it remains unclear whether something 
may be an obstacle without “discriminating” against arbitration. The Concepcion court’s ruling 
therefore may still prohibit more than the California rule. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 76.  Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 832 (2015). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); The 
California Court of Appeal was unpersuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Murphy v. 
DIRECTV, Inc.,  which reached an opposite conclusion after reviewing the same provision. In 
that case, the Ninth Circuit granted DIRECTV’s motion to compel arbitration, considering 
arguments of contract interpretation “largely irrelevant.” The Murphy court stated that 
California’s ban on class arbitration waivers had been preempted by Concepcion, wherein 
federal law became the law of the states. There could be no conflict between them and the 
poison pill clause was to be viewed under § 2 of the FAA. See 724 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 79.  Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 194 (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees 
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
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under “the law of [the customer’s] state.”80 In Imburgia, California law 
had triggered the poison pill clause, invalidating the arbitration 
agreement.81 The court deemed this permissible because the FAA had 
allowed the parties to “opt-out” of its default rules in some respects,82 
even if “state rules would yield a different result from . . . the FAA.”83 
Thus, the California Court of Appeal concluded that parties could 
contract to use California law regardless of the FAA’s preemptive 
effect.84 
Enforcing the Agreement by its terms, the court considered 
Section 9 unenforceable because the poison pill clause was excepted 
from the Agreement’s general adoption of the FAA.85 The court 
maintained that under well-settled principles of contract 
interpretation, when a specific and a general term conflict, the specific 
controls the general and defines its meaning.86 The issue of enforcing 
class arbitration waivers was thus considered under California law 
because the poison pill clause expressly stated it was governed by the 
law of the customer’s state.87 California’s CLRA held waivers of class 
arbitration unconscionable, but federal law would have permitted 
such a provision.88 The general and specific terms conflicted, but the 
parties had opted to resolve the issue under state law.89 The court held 
that this invoked the poison pill clause, thereby making Section 9’s 
arbitration agreement unenforceable.90 
The court found further support for denying DIRECTV’s motion 
because ambiguities are ordinarily construed against the drafter, in 
this case, DIRECTV.91 The Agreement was unclear insofar as it could 
be interpreted to demand FAA preemption despite a freely 
 
 80.  Id. at 193. 
 81.  Id. at 194. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. The court’s analysis relied heavily on Volt to reach its decision. In Volt, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote while the FAA was designed to facilitate arbitration, the “principal 
purpose [was] to ensure that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their 
terms.” Parties therefore did not undermine the Act by “[structuring] their arbitration 
agreements as they [saw] fit.” 489 U.S. at 478–79. 
 84.  Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195. 
 85.  Id; see supra Part I (discussing the Agreement’s invocation of the FAA under Section 
10, which subjected the parties to “applicable federal laws”). 
 86.  Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 197. 
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negotiated and explicit choice of law provision to the contrary.92 As 
the non-drafting party, Imburgia was entitled to her reasonable 
interpretation.93 The poison pill clause therefore remained in effect 
and the court ruled that DIRECTV could not compel arbitration.94 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  DIRECTV’s Arguments 
DIRECTV argues that the FAA preempts and invalidates 
California’s law against class arbitration waivers.95 According to 
DIRECTV, Congress precluded states from refusing to enforce 
arbitration agreements when it created a body of substantive federal 
law of arbitrability.96 Under this policy, ambiguities as to the scope of 
the arbitration clause are resolved in favor of arbitration.97 This 
includes ambiguities concerning the applicability of “inconsistent” 
state law.98 Although DIRECTV notes the interpretation of 
arbitration agreements is generally a matter of state law,99 DIRECTV 
claims that the FAA provides an exception when state law is 
inconsistent with federal arbitration law.100 DIRECTV thus argues 
that under the FAA, courts are required to rigorously enforce 
arbitration agreements according to their terms.101 This is necessary, 
DIRECTV adds, because the FAA’s substantive federal arbitration 
law “serves as an important check on the application of state law, 
safeguarding the parties’ federal arbitration rights.”102 
DIRECTV reasons that the Court of Appeal thus erred in holding 
that it could not compel arbitration.103 It argues that the Court of 
Appeal based its decision on “a legal nullity” and wrongly applied 
well-settled rules of contract interpretation.104 DIRECTV first 
outlines that the court recognized a conflict between the Act’s general 
 
 92.  Id. at 198, n.5. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 198. 
 95.  Brief for Petitioner at 10, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, No. 14-462 (U.S. May 29, 2015). 
 96.  Id. at 12. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 10. 
 99.  Id. at 13. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 14. 
 103.  Id. at 11. 
 104.  Id. at 21–22. 
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adoption of the FAA and the poison pill clause’s specific reference to 
“the law of [the customer’s] state.”105 In DIRECTV’s view, however, 
insofar as state law is separate, it is never immune from the ordinary 
preemptive effect of federal law.106 Therefore, federal law becomes the 
law of the states and the Court of Appeal interpreted a conflict when, 
in fact, the provisions were completely harmonized.107 Second, 
DIRECTV states that the court construed ambiguities in contract 
interpretation in favor of the non-drafting party.108 To the extent that 
such a construction could apply, DIRECTV argues that it conflicts 
with the requirement that ambiguities be resolved in favor of 
arbitration.109 
DIRECTV acknowledges that the FAA permits enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms.110 The Agreement, 
DIRECTV states, represented an “unmistakable” intent to arbitrate 
except when the relevant state law would force class arbitration.111 
Under § 10(b), the parties explicitly adopted the FAA as the 
governing authority under, providing that the Agreement “shall be 
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.”112 Therefore, according to 
DIRECTV, the parties reasonably expected the contract to be 
interpreted under the FAA.113 In any event, because state law is never 
immune from federal preemption, the CLRA’s antiwaiver provision 
carried the force of law that had been repealed, i.e., no force at all.114 
Although the FAA does not prevent parties from contracting to abide 
by nullified law, DIRECTV argues that no such terms appeared in the 
Agreement.115 As a matter of private contract, DIRECTV claims that 
the court should have interpreted the Agreement by its terms as 
compelling arbitration under the FAA.116 
DIRECTV therefore argues that the Court should reverse the 
judgment below.117 
 
 105.  Id. at 21. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 22. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 22–23. 
 110.  Id. at 11. 
 111.  Id. at 10. 
 112.  Id. at 14–15. 
 113.  Id. at 18. 
 114.  Id. at 19–20. 
 115.  Id. at 20. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 24. 
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B.  Imburgia’s Arguments 
Imburgia argues that the Court of Appeal was correct to apply 
California law because interpreting the FAA as barring enforcement 
of applicable state law is “unprecedented.”118 Imburgia therefore 
contends that the FAA requires the result reached by the Court of 
Appeal.119 First, Imburgia argues the FAA compels enforcement of 
agreements by their terms.120 Second, the FAA does not prevent 
parties from forming binding contracts under state law.121 As a result, 
Imburgia concludes that the FAA does not express a federal policy 
that necessarily compels construction of any ambiguity in favor of 
arbitration.122 Rather, according to Imburgia, arbitration agreements 
are enforced “like other contracts” according to their terms and the 
intentions of the parties.123 
Imburgia further states that contracts should not be enforced in 
contravention of the parties’ intention.124 For this reason, Imburgia 
claims that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion preempted California 
law only because it “overrode the parties’ own agreement with 
respect to a central element of the arbitral proceedings.”125 In 
Imburgia’s view, the Court did not invalidate Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court  because it was an obstacle to a federal policy favoring 
arbitration, but because it required class arbitration contrary to the 
parties’ intentions.126 The Discover Bank rule thus conflicted with 
enforcement according to the terms of the contract as required by the 
FAA and was subject to preemption.127 
Imburgia also contends that the Court of Appeal’s judgment 
should stand because it correctly interpreted the terms of the contract 
as invoking California law.128 Imburgia argues that even if the court 
interpreted “the law of [the customer’s] state” to include the 
preemptive effect of federal law, the FAA preempts only 
 
 118.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 19, at 11. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 11–12. 
 121.  Id. at 12. 
 122.  Id. at 12. 
 123.  Id. at 15 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995)). 
 124.  See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 19, at 15–16 (recognizing the role that 
parties intentions have played in interpretation of contract agreements, notably where the result 
does not favor arbitration). 
 125.  Id. at 16. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 16–17. 
 128.  Id. at 17. 
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“requirements imposed by positive state law that would override the 
parties’ own agreement.”129 Therefore, Imburgia claims the FAA may 
invalidate a conflicting state law but does not limit parties’ from a 
choice to incorporate California’s antiwaiver provision.130 Imburgia 
thus concludes that the FAA seeks to enforce contracts according to 
the terms as intended.131 
Imburgia rejects DIRECTV’s argument that the FAA preempts 
California’s invalidation of class arbitration waivers and instead 
argues that the Agreement ought to be enforced under state law as 
both parties intended.132 According to Imburgia, the FAA has never 
required preemption because it permits parties to contract using state 
law and compels enforcement “according to the terms.”133 Imburgia 
adds that the Agreement in question included the poison pill clause so 
that it could be used nationwide for all customers.134 In doing so, 
Imburgia claims the poison pill clause inherently recognized that 
“certain provisions [would] apply in some states but not others,” 
showing that state law had been explicitly incorporated and it was the 
intent of the parties to be governed by state law.135 Thus, the 
Agreement was appropriately enforced under the law of California 
because the FAA did not preempt the parties’ choice.136 
Finally, Imburgia contends that Concepcion is distinguishable 
because, unlike the present case, the Concepcion agreement never 
incorporated California law.137 Instead, one party merely challenged 
enforcement of the arbitration clause.138 Imburgia claims Concepcion 
held that California’s law was preempted only because the parties had 
not agreed to be bound by it.139 Imburgia states the Court therefore 
did not establish a substantive ban on class arbitration waivers 
 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 21 (quoting Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 303 
(2010)). 
 132.  Id. at 23. 
 133.  See id. at 21–22 (arguing that the Court explicitly rejected the notion that the FAA 
does not permit application of state law in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees 
of the Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 471 (1989)). 
 134.  Id. at 23. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 24. 
 137.  Id. at 25. 
 138.  See id. (“[T]he plaintiffs argued that California law overrode the terms of the 
agreement.”) 
 139.  See id. (“As DIRECTV explains, Concepcion's actual holding is that ‘state law 
cannot force people to arbitrate on a classwide basis.’”). 
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because Concepcion dealt with a different issue altogether.140 
Imburgia therefore requests that the Court affirm the judgment 
below.141 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The California Court of Appeal’s decision is flawed for several 
reasons. First, the plain meaning of the Agreement requires the court 
to enforce arbitration. Second, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion prohibits state courts from 
interpreting class arbitration waivers against arbitration. Third, the 
California court’s ruling creates a negative right against arbitration, in 
contravention of clearly stated congressional objectives and public 
policy. For these reasons, the court erred in finding the arbitration 
clause unenforceable. 
A.  The Plain Meaning of the Agreement Requires the Court to 
Enforce Arbitration 
The plain meaning of the Agreement resolves the issue raised in 
Imburgia in favor of enforcement. This conclusion is inescapable 
because the Agreement must be read with respect to federal law, 
which renders the unconscionability doctrine in this case invalid. 
Through the FAA, Congress established federal regulations for 
enforcing arbitration agreements across the United States142 in order 
to put arbitration “upon the same footing as other contracts, where it 
belongs.”143 All such agreements fall within its scope.144 This includes 
agreements to be governed by state law principles, because those 
terms are only given effect under § 4 of the FAA.145 Similarly, 
arbitration agreements may be held unenforceable using only 
generally applicable contract defenses to the extent they are 
authorized under the savings clause of § 2.146 Therefore, as the Court 
of Appeal agrees, parties to an arbitration agreement can never fully 
 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 46. 
 142.  Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended 
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012)). 
 143.  H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1 (1924). 
 144.  See Federal Arbitration Act § 1 (defining the broad scope of the FAA).  
 145.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 146.  Id. 
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“opt-out” of federal regulation.147 Rather, federal regulation provides 
the underlying framework for all arbitration.148 
Although the Federal Arbitration Act may give effect to 
compatible state law, nothing in it suggests an intent to accommodate 
conflicting doctrine.149 This is because, as a general principle, “[an] act 
cannot be held to destroy itself.”150 State law which would have such 
an effect on a federal act is preempted under the Supremacy Clause 
and invalid.151 
The Court of Appeal’s application of California’s 
unconscionability doctrine would destroy federal implementation of 
the FAA. It would sanction courts’ disfavoring arbitration and could 
halt enforcement of agreements in California. This is prohibited.152 
Similarly, the court’s reading further interferes with Congress’s intent 
to put arbitration “upon the same footing as other contracts.”153 The 
state, however, is barred from interfering with a federal program.154 
Thus, the court’s ruling attempts to use its authority to interpret 
contracts as a means of circumventing federal preemption. Under the 
Supremacy Clause, this is unconstitutional.155 
The poison pill clause states that if “the law of [the customer’s] 
state would find this agreement to dispense with class arbitration 
procedures unenforceable, then this entire Section 9 is 
unenforceable.”156 In interpreting this provision, the court may not 
adopt a view which is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal’s reading 
was unconstitutional because it disfavored arbitration and 
circumvented preemption.157 This rendered the unconscionability 
doctrine invalid against the arbitration agreement. Having no other 
basis under federal or state law not to enforce the Agreement, the 
Court of Appeal should have compelled arbitration. 
 
 147.  Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012). 
 150.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting Am. Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227–228 (1998)). 
 151.  See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2008) (stating the FAA preempted 
otherwise permissible state laws governing arbitration that interfered with its functions). 
 152.  See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) 
(prohibiting courts from disfavoring arbitration). 
 153.  H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1 (1924). 
 154.  Preston, 552 U.S. at 357–58. 
 155.  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984). 
 156.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
 157.  See Moses, 460 U.S. at 24 (stating that courts should, as a matter of federal law, resolve 
“any doubts” concerning the scope of arbitration in favor of arbitration). 
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B.  Concepcion Prohibits State Courts from Interpreting Waivers 
Against Arbitration 
The issue in Concepcion was whether the FAA prohibits States 
from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements 
on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures. The Court 
found that § 2 preempted California’s rule against class arbitration 
waivers.158 In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, California had adopted 
a rule against class arbitration waivers in adhesion contracts because 
they are “indisputably” and “unfairly” one-sided.159 Concepcion 
invalidated Discover Bank on the grounds that it “interfere[d] with 
arbitration.”160 Concepcion’s precedent thereby became binding. 
Under the Supremacy Clause, the California Court of Appeal had no 
authority to undermine a Supreme Court ruling.161 The message of 
Concepcion was twofold: interpret arbitration agreements in favor of 
arbitration and do not obstruct federal arbitration.162 The Court of 
Appeal ignored both. 
The California court further refused to enforce the agreement 
against conventional wisdom of contract interpretation—to interpret 
contracts as valid rather than invalid.163 Instead, the Court chose to 
interpret the arbitration agreement “against the drafter,” a canon of 
construction rooted in the same rationales of unfairness as Discover 
Bank.164 In this way, the court’s choice to interpret terms against the 
drafter merely repackages Discover Bank toward the same result. 
Claims that arbitration agreements are generally “unfair” were 
foreclosed by Congress’s choice to enforce arbitration.165 The court’s 
interpretation in Imburgia was therefore unreasonable and suggests 
its motives were improper. 
Finally, the facts of Concepcion and Imburgia are not materially 
distinguishable. In both cases, one party challenged the enforcement 
 
 158.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 159.  113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005). 
 160.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750. 
 161.  See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (affirming federal supremacy). 
 162.  Id. at 1749. 
 163.  See generally, Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 228–29 (indicating that 
interpretations making a contract lawful and enforceable are preferred over interpretations that 
render part or all of the contract unenforceable, illegal, or unreasonable and result in 
forefeiture).  
 164.  See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995) (“The 
reason for this rule is to protect the party who did not choose the language from an unintended 
or unfair result.”). 
 165.  See supra Part II.B. 
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of arbitration that lacked classwide arbitration procedures.166 
Although the Agreement in Imburgia invoked state law in the poison 
pill clause, there was no valid basis under state law to render the 
contract unenforceable.167 The inclusion of a poison pill clause thus 
holds no bearing on the Court’s reasoning. Rather, the Court’s ruling 
in Concepcion addressed a broader issue that common law 
unconscionability of arbitration could not stand as an obstacle to 
federal policy.168 The Discover Bank rule and the CLRA’s antiwaiver 
provision are mere refinements of California’s unconscionability 
doctrine and thus fall squarely within the Court’s ruling. After 
Concepcion, such defenses were barred. Under the Supremacy Clause, 
the Court of Appeal decision is invalid because it is contrary to 
Concepcion.169 
C.  The Court of Appeal’s Decision Confers a Negative Right to 
Breach Arbitration Agreements Against Public Policy 
California courts are further precluded from applying 
unconscionability to class arbitration waivers because doing so 
confers a negative right to breach agreements.170 Such a right would be 
against public policy. Congress enacted the FAA to provide 
“streamlined proceedings and expeditious results” as an alternative to 
litigation.171 As part of this regime, Congress provided individuals with 
a remedy at law to ensure agreements would be enforced “according 
to the terms thereof”172 and on the “same footing” as any other 
contract.173 This was the only right the FAA conferred.174 
The Court of Appeal’s interpretation, however, confers a negative 
right against arbitration and stands as an obstacle to federal 
 
 166.  Compare AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (addressing 
a challenge to an arbitration agreement absent classwide arbitration procedures under 
California’s unconscionability doctrine), with Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
190, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (considering a challenge to an arbitration agreement not 
precluded because the parties specifically agreed to be governed by California’s 
unconscionability doctrine). 
 167.  See supra Part II.A. 
 168.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 169.  See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (affirming federal supremacy). 
 170.  A negative right is a “right entitling a person to have another refrain from doing an act 
that might harm the person entitled.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (10th ed. 2014). 
 171.  Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2008). 
 172.  9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 173.  H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1 (1924). 
 174.  See 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (“It creates no new legislation, grants no new rights, 
except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts.”). 
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implementation. This negative right enables a party to breach a 
contract solely because it deems the form of arbitration unfair, despite 
a clear agreement to arbitrate. Were the Supreme Court to adopt this 
view, it would sanction the breach and open the door for other states 
to do the same. These breaches, however, are against public policy 
because they undermine the expectations of parties when drafting 
and would have a chilling effect on negotiations. They also give 
preference to the choice of some parties over others based on 
location. As a result, parties would be unable to predict how a court 
would interpret an agreement and transactional costs would increase 
since parties would be drawn into court to enforce the negative right. 
Furthermore, a party would have to factor those costs into the price of 
service, potentially resulting in higher rates for customers nationally 
or different pricing between localities.175 Most importantly, it would 
conflict with Congress’s clear public policy favoring the enforcement 
of arbitration.176 
Finally, it is unclear whether parties’ interests would be better 
protected through class action litigation. In class action suits, damages 
are frequently high but distributed among a large number of litigants. 
The payout may ultimately be small. In contrast, individual arbitration 
procedures often promise individuals guaranteed payouts and 
subsidize the costs of attorneys fees.177 This is in exchange for caps on 
total damages. Such a procedure protects concerns of both parties and 
facilitates an equitable settlement. Thus, individual arbitration may 
provide claimants with more benefits than would class litigation. The 
Court should therefore reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision in the 
interest of public policy. 
 
 
 175.  Although the FAA does not prohibit any discriminatory pricing, Congress has done so 
elsewhere under the Communications Act of 1934. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. 
No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, § 201 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2012)); see also Am. 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 223 (1998) (“[T]he policy of 
nondiscriminatory rates is violated when similarly situated customers pay different rates for the 
same services.”). 
 176.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 177.  See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (“The 
agreement, moreover, denies AT & T any ability to seek reimbursement of its attorney’s fees, 
and, in the event that a customer receives an arbitration award greater than AT & T’s last 
written settlement offer, requires AT & T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the 
amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees.”) 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision in DIRECTV v. Imburgia largely comes down to 
competing views of the Federal Arbitration Act. DIRECTV argues 
that the Act preempts and invalidates any state law that frustrates the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. Imburgia contends that the 
Act compels consideration of arbitration agreements under state law 
when those contracts have explicitly and intentionally adopted state 
law as the governing authority. To the extent that both interpretations 
are plausible, Imburgia’s position would effectively sanction states’ 
discrimination against arbitration agreements so long as those states 
found that the parties invoked hostile state law principles. This 
construction plainly frustrates the implementation of § 2 and cannot 
be reconciled. The Court should therefore reverse the California 
Court of Appeal and, in furtherance of Congress’s objectives, reaffirm 
that states are fully preempted from enforcing agreements under state 
doctrines that would disfavor arbitration. 
 
